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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
SHIRLEY ANN PRETTYMAN,
Administratrix of the Estate
of Ted LeRoy Prettyman, deceased,
CALVIN vV. RAWLINGS,
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS,
WAYNE L. BLACK, JOHN L.
BLACK and RICHARD C.
DIBBLEE, dba RAWLINGS,
ROBERTS, & BLACK, and A.
JOHN RUGGERI,
Plaintiffs/ Respondents,
-vs.-

Case No.

12493

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCE, as Administrator
of the State Insurance Fund,
HERBERT F. SMART as
Director of the Utah State
Department of Finance, and
GOLDEN L. ALLEN, State
Treasurer,
Defendoot/ Appellants.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/ APPELLANTS
Appeal from the Judgment of the Dirstict
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Honorable Stuart M. Hanson,
District Judge
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to attorneys
f Pes based upon a percentage of an Industrial Commis-

2
sion award for an on the job injury suffered when the
defendants liability on said award is mitigated by virtue
of the plaintiffs' successful prosecution of a "third party
law suit" brought under the provisions of Section 35-1-62,
Utah Code Ann. (Replacement Volume 1956).
DISPOSI'l'ION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs received Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of lower court Judgment
and an award of Judgment based on appellants' Counterclaim.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Plaintiffs in this action are Shirley Prettyman as

Administratrix of the
and her attorneys.

of Ted LeRoy Prettyman

2. Ted Ldfoy Prettyman died August 30, 1965, in
an on the job industrial accident caused by a third party
tort-feasor.
3. On November 2, 1965, the State Industrial Commission ordered the defendants State Insurance Fund
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to make vV orkmans Compensation payments to Shirley
Ann Prettyman, wife of the deceased.
4. rrhe amount of the award was $18,720.00 together
with: $525.00 funeral allowance making a total of
$19,24500.
5. Plaintiffs commenced a third party law suit to
obtain damages from the third party tort-feasor whose
negligence caused the on the job injury and death of Ted
LeRoy Prettyman.
6. That snit was compromised in July of 1967 for
the sum of $60,000.00 and, as a result thereof, the defendants were relieved from making any further payments
under the Industrial Commission award.
7. At the time of the compromise, the State Insurance Fund had paid benefits, under the award, to the
plaintiffs in the sum of $5,985.00.
8. At the time of the settlement, a dispute arose regarding attorneys fees to be paid by the State Insurance
Fund on the third party law suit. The plaintiffs demanded a fee from the defendant Insurance Fund in the
amount of one-third of $19,225.00, the total amount of
of the ·workman Compensation award. The amount they
d(mianded was $6,415.00. The State Insurance Fund
rejected that demand. All of the above events, except the
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settlement of the third party law suit, occurred prior to
the Utah Supreme Court decision in the case of W orthin
vs. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 80 426 P. 2d
233 and, at the time, the events took place including the
injury, the Industrial Commission award, payments
under the award, and the institution of the third party
law suit, the Utah Supreme Court case of McConnell vs.
Commissioner of Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P. 2d 394,
(1962) enunciated the controlling law on the issues in
this case, i.e., the compensation carrier was not required
to pay a portion of the attorneys fees and court costs of
''third party actions".
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS/ APPELLANTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PAY A PORTION OF ATTORNEY
FEES IN SUITS UNDER 35-1-62 ON CASES WITH
FACTS OCCURRING PRIOR TO THE DECISION IN
WORTHEN VS. SHURTLEFF AND ANDREWS, INC.

AND, THUS, ATTORNEYS FEES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE PAID BY DEFENDANTS IN THIS
ACTION.

The statute involved in Section 35-1-62 Utah Code
Awn.otated (Replacement Volume 1966 which provides
as follows:
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. \\?ien an injury or death for which compensat10n lS }Jayable under this title shall have been
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another
vernon not in _the same employment as the injured
employee, or m the case of death his dependants
.
' injured em-'
may claim
compensation and the
ployee or his heirs or personal representatives
may also have an action for damages against such
third person ....
If any recovery is obtainable against such
third person, it shall be disbursed as follows:

( 1) A reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys fees, shall be paid and charged pro'"
portionately against the parties as their interest
may appear.
In 1962, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted Section 35-1-62 in the case of 1vlcConnell vs. Commissioner
of Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P.2d 394 (1962). In the
McConnell case, the court held that the statute did not
require the insurance carrier to bear a portion of the
attorneys fees in third party law suits brought under
the provisions of Section 35-1-62. The statute was again
interpreted on April 3, 19G7, in the case of Worthen vs.
Slrnrtle/f and
Inc., 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P. 2d 233
(19G7). In the Worthen case, the court held that insurance carriers and employers must bear a portion of
attorney fees in third party law suits brought under the
provisions of Section 35-1-62. As might be expected,
daims were then brought against the insurance carriers
fur attorney's fees on accidents occurring prior to the
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decision in Worthen. The insurance carriers def ended
these actions on the grounds that the decision in
W orthe1i should not be applied retroatcively so as to
allow attorneys fees in actions where the injuries occurred prior to the Worthen decision. They argued that
the Worthen. decision should only be applied prospectively and that for reasons of reliance and stability in the
precedence theory that McConnell vs. Commissioner of
Finance would control all cases with facts occurring
prior to the Worthen decision. (See appellant's brief
Williams ct al., vs. Utah State Department of Finance,
Case no. 11753.) The Utah Supreme Court, accepting the
argument of appellants, decided in Williams et al. vs.
Utah DepartJnent of Fina111ce, 23 Utah 2d 438, 464 P. 2d
596 (1970) that the Worthen case requiring insurance
carriers to pay a portion of the attorney fees in third
party law suits, should not be applied retroactively and
that the lllcConnell case holding insurance carriers were
not required to pay attorneys fees would be controlling
on cases arising prior to Worthen. In the instant case,
all of the operative facts occurred prior to the Worthen
decision. The industrial accident occurred prior to the

Worthen decision; the death occurred prior to the
Worthen decision; the Industrial Commission claim and
award occurred iirior to the Worthen decision; payments
under the award sarted prior to the Worthen decision;
and the third party law suit commenced prior to the
decision in Worth!'n. The only incident with respect to
this law suit that occurred subsequent to Worthen was
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the settlement of the third party law suit. Thus, it would
appear, inasmuch as th eoperative facts in the present
case occurred prior to the Worthen decision ,that the
Utah Supreme Court holding in Williams, et al., vs.
Commissioner of Finance, sitpra, should be controlling
and, therefore, the insurance carrier in the instant action
should not be required to pay a portion of the attorneys
fees in third party law suit.
POINT II
ASSUMING THE DEFENDANTS ARE REQUIR ED TO PAY A PORTION OF THE ATTORNEYS
FEES IN THE THIRD PARTY LAW SUIT IN THIS
CASE,
BASED

THE

ATTORNEYS

UPON

A

FEES

SHOULD

PERCENTAGE

OF

BE
THE

AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION PAID BY THE INSURANCE CARRIER AND RECEIVED BY IT ON
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE THIRD PARTY LAW
SUIT RATHER THAN BASED ON A PECENTAGE
OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION AWARD.

Plaintiffs base their cause of action on the provisions of Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol.
1966) (See Paragraph 6 of plaintiffs' Complaint), and,
therefore, plaintiffs' claims are controlled by the statute
and the rules of statutory construction. See, e.g., McConnell vs. Commission Finance, 13 Utah 2d 2d 375 P.
2d 394 (1962); Worthen vs. Shrittleff and Andrews, Inc.,
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19 Utah 2d 80 42G P.2d 233 (19G7); Williams et al., vs.
Utah D<'partment of Fi11ance, 23 Utah 2d 438, 4G4 P. 2d
596 (1970). Section 35-l-G2 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol.
19G8), provides that in the event there is a recovery from
a third party law suit:
If any recovery is obtained against such
third person, it shall be disbursed as follows:

(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys fees, shall be paid and charged
proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed in full for all payments
ma<le ...
Plaintiffs argue that under the above statute, they
are entitled to attomeys fees based upon a percentage
of the Industrial Commission award, not based upon the
aount reimbursed. to the insurance carrier. Plaintiffs
claim do have some emotional appeal inasmuch as the
ultimate result of the third party lawsuit may be to absolve the
carrier from any further liability to
the plaintiff, and, 1lwrdore, the benefit conferred on the
insuranee carrier may be not only reimbursement of
monies paid but also release from future liability.
While such argument may have emotional appeal, it
does not have sn1Jport in law or the language of the
statute. The statute
the disbursement to be
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made from the third party lawsuit recovery. Obviously,
::mch language does not contemplate the Industrial Commission award. If plaintiffs' theory were correct, in
many cases, including the instant case, the amount the
insurance carrier would be obligated to pay would exceed
its share of the recovery. For example, assume the Industrial Commission had awarded plaintiff $18,000.00 of
which the insurance carrier had paid $5,000.00. In the
event of a successful third party suit, the insurance carrier's maximmn share of recovery would be $5,000.00.
If the plaintiffs receive judgment against the third party
tort-feasor for $18,000.00 the insurance carrier, under
plaintiffs' theory, would have to pay $6,000.00 in attorneys fees, $1,000.00 more than its share of the recovery. In the present case, plaintiffs' claim $6,415.00
while defendants share of the recovery is $5,985.00. Thus,
plaintiffs' claim $430.00 more than defendants' share of
of the recovery. Thus, plaintiffs' position can find no
support in the statutory language on which they seek to
base their cause of action, which language states the
attorneys fees are to be paid from the parties share of
the recovery.
The other important word in the statute is "inter- ,
est". The statute requires the parties to pay attorneys
fees as "their interest may appear." The question is
whether the insurance carrier's interest in the third party
recovery is the amount they have paid to plaintiff or the
amount they may eventually have to pay based upon the
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award. It would seem difficult for plaintiff to argue the
amount to be paid in the future is the insurance funds
interest as that amount is not liquidated. See Section
35-1-78 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1966). Furthermore,
the present value of an award is substantially more than
the amount of the award to be paid over a future· period
of years inasmuch as the value of money is decreasing
and the insurance carrier would have the use of the unpaid award over the period of years. Therefore, it is
indefensible to argue that the insurance carrier's present interest in the third party lawsuit is the amount of
the Industrial Commission award.
It is more sensible and supportable to argue that
the insurance carrier's interest in the third party lawsuit

recovery is the amount it has paid to the plaintiff as part
of the Industrial Commission award. There is no doubt
that this is the amount which the insurance carrier will
be reimbursed and further the amount to which they
subrogate and sue. See 35-1-62 Utah Code Ami. (Repl.
vol. 1968); Furthermore, all cases which have interpreted
Section 35-1-62 have either held or assumed that the insurance carrier's interest under that statute is the
amount that it haR paid to the injured plaintiff. See

J. V. Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, 150 F. 2d 247
(following Johannson vs. Cudahy Packing Company, 107
Utah 114, 152 P. 2d 98. In the Cudahy case, cited supra,
the court stated:
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But the election of dependents to take compensation does not give the insurance carrier liable for compensation, any interest in the
of a?tion. It obtains interest in the case only by
makrng payments on the award.
Thus, it is not only more sensible and logical to argue that the insurance carrier's interest in the amount it
has paid under the award rather than the total award,
but such position is also supportable in case law.
CONCLUSION
The defendants in the present case should not be
required to pay attorneys fees and the judgment and
award of the District Court should be reversed with
judgment granted in favor of the appellant on the
grounds that the cliams in the present action are controlled by McConnell vs. Commissioner of Finance requiring no payment of attorney fees, based upon the
nonretro-activity effect laid down in the case of Williams
et al., vs. Department of Finance. Assuming the court
is of the opinion that attorneys fees are required to be
paid by appellant, said attorneys fees should be based
upon the amount reimbursed to the State Insurance
Fund or, its share of the recovery, rather than on the
total amount of the award.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard J. Leedy

